Ithaka Science Center dankt :
• Provincie Limburg
• Platform Beta Techniek
• Gemeente Venlo
• ING-bank
• Trias projecten, subsidies, management
• Com-B-Nations BV
• SNS bank
• NV Regio Venlo
• Apple
• AM Bridge
• Gemeente Weert
• Fortior
• Seacon Logistics
voor hun ondersteuning.
• Provincie Limburg
• Platform Beta Techniek
• Gemeente Venlo
• ING-bank
• Trias projecten, subsidies, management
• Com-B-Nations BV
• SNS bank
• NV Regio Venlo
• Apple
• AM Bridge
• Gemeente Weert
• Fortior
• Seacon Logistics
voor hun ondersteuning.
Professor Maskin’s lezing in Nederland op 26 mei 2009
Op 26 mei 2009 bracht professor dr. Eric Maskin op uitnodiging van Ithaka Science Center een bezoek aan Venlo. Hij hield een lezing voor een publiek van zakenmensen, beleidsmakers en andere belangstellenden. De toehoorders waren onverdeeld enthousiast over de inhoud van de lezing en over en de wijze waarop Prof. Maskin zijn ‘Mechanism Design Theory’ uiteenzette.
Commissaris van de Koningin van de Provincie Limburg, de heer Leon Frissen, wethouder Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt van de Gemeente Venlo, de heer Ramon Testroote en wethouder Economische Zaken en Financiën van de Gemeente Venlo, de heer Mark Verheijen verwelkomden professor Maskin in Venlo. Zij spreken het publiek kort toe over het belang van science educatie in de regio.
Hieronder treft u aan: een videoweergave, een korte samenvatting van de lezing en enkele foto’s van de informele bijeenkomst achteraf.
Prof. Dr. Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study
Mechanism Design Theory - How to implement social goals
The theory of mechanism design is the “engeneering” part of economic theory. Much of economic theory is devoted to:
- understanding existing economic institutions
- exploring predicting outcomes that institutions generate
Mechanism Design Theory:
Examples are better than definitions for explanation:
Example 1:
Why does it work? Example illustrates key features of mechanism design. Designer does not know optimal outcomes, so must proceed through a mechanism, but complication: participants do not care and have own objectives, so mechanism must be incentive cooperable.
Example 2:
Solution: every company makes bid for licence; winner is high bidder; winner pays second-highest bid; now a company has no incentive to understate or overstate; so best to bid exactly what licence is worth.
Example 3:
Alice (in state 1) favours gas over oil, oil over coal and coal over nuclear.
Alice (in state 2) favours nuclear over gas, gas over coal, and coal over oil.
Energy authority wants source that makes good compromise, so oil is social optimum in state 1, while gas is social optimum in state 2.
Alice always prefers gas to oil (gas optimal in state 2)
Bob always prefers oil to gas (has incentive to say state 1)
Alice toprow or bottomrow; Bob left column or right column; the outcome is given by table entries.
If state 1 holdes: Alice will prefer top row, Bob plays left column
In state 2: Alice bottom strategy and Bob right strategy.
Thus in either state mechanism achieves social optimum.
I have shown 3 examples, but analyses may seem a bit ad hoc. Is there a general way? Whether or not a given goal is implementable, if it IS implementable, can we find a mechanism?
I have looked at 3 applications of mechanism design theory; there are many other potential applications for example: international treaty on greenhouses gas emissions; policies to prevent financial crises.
Mechanism design theory = instrument for discovering which mechanism is the right one (solution).
Perception is the key to mechanism design; however people perceep, the mechanism design theory will leed to the right solution.
Op 26 mei 2009 bracht professor dr. Eric Maskin op uitnodiging van Ithaka Science Center een bezoek aan Venlo. Hij hield een lezing voor een publiek van zakenmensen, beleidsmakers en andere belangstellenden. De toehoorders waren onverdeeld enthousiast over de inhoud van de lezing en over en de wijze waarop Prof. Maskin zijn ‘Mechanism Design Theory’ uiteenzette.
Commissaris van de Koningin van de Provincie Limburg, de heer Leon Frissen, wethouder Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt van de Gemeente Venlo, de heer Ramon Testroote en wethouder Economische Zaken en Financiën van de Gemeente Venlo, de heer Mark Verheijen verwelkomden professor Maskin in Venlo. Zij spreken het publiek kort toe over het belang van science educatie in de regio.
Hieronder treft u aan: een videoweergave, een korte samenvatting van de lezing en enkele foto’s van de informele bijeenkomst achteraf.
Prof. Dr. Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study
Mechanism Design Theory - How to implement social goals
The theory of mechanism design is the “engeneering” part of economic theory. Much of economic theory is devoted to:
- understanding existing economic institutions
- exploring predicting outcomes that institutions generate
Mechanism Design Theory:
Examples are better than definitions for explanation:
Example 1:
- a mother has to divide a cake among her children Alison and Bob.
- Is there a mechanism (procedure) for fair division ?
- Solution: Bob divides, Alice chooses.
Why does it work? Example illustrates key features of mechanism design. Designer does not know optimal outcomes, so must proceed through a mechanism, but complication: participants do not care and have own objectives, so mechanism must be incentive cooperable.
Example 2:
- government want to sell right (licence) to transmit on band of radiofrequences.
- several telecommunication companies interested in licence
- goal government: put licence in hands of company that values it most
Solution: every company makes bid for licence; winner is high bidder; winner pays second-highest bid; now a company has no incentive to understate or overstate; so best to bid exactly what licence is worth.
Example 3:
- consider a society with two consumers of energy: Alice and Bob
- Energy authority must choose public energy source.
- Energy sources: gas-oil-coal-nuclear
-
two states of world:
- state1 consumers weight future lightly
- state2 consumers weight future heavily
Alice (in state 1) favours gas over oil, oil over coal and coal over nuclear.
Alice (in state 2) favours nuclear over gas, gas over coal, and coal over oil.
| State 1 | State 2 | ||
| Alice | Bob | Alice | Bob |
| gas | nuclear | nuclear | oil |
| oil | oil | gas | gas |
| coal | coal | coal | coal |
| nuclear | gas | oil | nuclear |
Energy authority wants source that makes good compromise, so oil is social optimum in state 1, while gas is social optimum in state 2.
Alice always prefers gas to oil (gas optimal in state 2)
Bob always prefers oil to gas (has incentive to say state 1)
| Bob | ||
| Alice | oil | coal |
| nuclear | gas |
Alice toprow or bottomrow; Bob left column or right column; the outcome is given by table entries.
If state 1 holdes: Alice will prefer top row, Bob plays left column
In state 2: Alice bottom strategy and Bob right strategy.
Thus in either state mechanism achieves social optimum.
I have shown 3 examples, but analyses may seem a bit ad hoc. Is there a general way? Whether or not a given goal is implementable, if it IS implementable, can we find a mechanism?
I have looked at 3 applications of mechanism design theory; there are many other potential applications for example: international treaty on greenhouses gas emissions; policies to prevent financial crises.
Mechanism design theory = instrument for discovering which mechanism is the right one (solution).
Perception is the key to mechanism design; however people perceep, the mechanism design theory will leed to the right solution.